JUVENILE STATUTES AND NONCRIMINAL
DELINQUENTS: APPLYING THE VOID-FORVAGUENESS DOCTRINE
Juvenile court jurisdiction, in virtually all states, extends not only
to those children who violate criminal laws and to neglected or dependent children, but also to juveniles whose conduct is of a noncriminal nature.' Forty-one states have omnibus clauses in their juvenile
statutes covering behavior or circumstances which endanger the child's
welfare. 2 Most of these clauses contain references to idle or immoral conduct which are broad, all-encompassing, and incapable of precise definition.3 Such broadly drawn clauses vest the juvenile court with virtually
absolute discretion to adjudicate a child delinquent on the basis of noncriminal conduct. 4 According to national juvenile court records, delinquency adjudications based on behavior illegal only for juveniles, such
as curfew regulations and conduct variously designated as "beyond control," "ungovernable," "incorrigible," "runaway," or "in need of supervision" accounts for over twenty-five per cent of the total number of
delinquency adjudications, and from twenty-five to thirty per cent of
the delinquent children in state institutions. n Analysis of the juvenile
court's expansive jurisdiction based on regulation and control of noncriminal behavior through broadly drawn statutes must begin with
a review of the historical rationale and development of the juvenile
court system.
At the end of the last century, an increasing social awareness
prompted reformers, who were incensed with the subjection of juveniles
I

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. See generally Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect, and
Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 44 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
2 Comment, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L Rrv.
352, 358-60 (1969). A table indicating the results of a comparative study of the various
types of conduct which constitute delinquency according to the juvenile codes of the fifty
states may be found at 369-71.
3 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. See Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
over "Immoral" Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REv. 568, 568 n.5 (1972). An up-to-date
list of statutory citations to juvenile court acts is found at 568 n.l. In fifteen states a
child is delinquent if he is judged to be "incorrigible." In thirty three states he may be
adjudged delinquent if he is "ungovernable." See Comment, supra note 2, at 358.
4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
5 Id. at 4. Estimates indicate the probability that "beyond-control" referrals comprise more than one-third of the nation's juvenile court cases. Bazelon, Beyond Control of
the Juvenile Court, 21 JUV. CT. JuDGEs J. 42, 42 (1970).
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3-4, 25 (1967)
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to the same procedures and penalties accorded adults, to agitate for
the establishment of a separate system of courts uniquely for juveniles.6
On July 1, 1899, the Illinois state legislature established the first
juvenile court, and by 1925 only two states lacked a juvenile court
system; today every state has a juvenile court act.7 The state's authority
to legislate in the area of the protection, care, custody, and maintenance
of juveniles was a manifestation of the doctrine of parens patriae.8
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty
but to custody." . . . If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions-that is, if the child is "delinquent"
-the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the
child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the
"custody" to which the child is entitled.9
The role of the juvenile court was not to determine the guilt or
innocence of the child, as in an adversary system, but rather to reform
and treat the delinquent through a rehabilitative system. 10 Thus,
6 Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1187 (1970). For a brief discussion of the history and theory of the juvenile court movement see Ketcham, The Unfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in JusTIcE
FOR THE CISLD 22, 22-25 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962) and Welch, Delinquency ProceedingsFundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-CriminalForum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653
(1966).
7 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
8 See Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the ConstitutionalLimits of
Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prrr. L. RaV. 894, 894 (1966). Justice Fortas, writing for
the Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), expressed doubts regarding the theory's
validity:
The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize
the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance.
Id. at 16.
9 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (footnote omitted).
10 S. Glueck & E. Glueck, The Juvenile Court: HistoricalBackground, in THE PROBLEM
OF DELINQUENCY 257 (S. Glueck ed. 1959).
New Jersey's own supreme court has regarded the philosophy of the juvenile court
system as directed towards "rehabilitation through reformation and education;" its goal is
"to restore a delinquent youth to a position of responsible citizenship." State v. L.N., 109
N.J. Super. 278, 286, 263 A.2d 150, 154-55 (App. Div.), afJ'd per curiam, 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d
409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971). Thus, the state's authority, exercised as parens
patriae, was directed at the rehabilitation of the youthful offender rather than his
punishment. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
See generally Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
Dean Paulsen's view expressed in this article, as he later explained, was based on the
assumption that the treatment offered by the juvenile court was in fact rehabilitative. For
his current position, see Paulsen, supra note 1, at 53. Dean Paulsen notes that retribution
has remained an influential factor in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
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understanding, guidance, and protection were emphasized,11 while
guilt, punishment, and criminal responsibility were deemphasized or
12
abandoned.
The highest motives and most enlightened impulses had led to the
creation of the juvenile court system. 18 However, the original hope
that the system had the capacity of fulfilling its goals was cast into
4
doubt in the face of the high rates of juvenile crime and recidivism.1
The juvenile system, which had functioned from its inception largely
free of constitutional protections, appeared to be ineffective either in
15
reducing crime or in rehabilitating offenders.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice emphasized the failure of the juvenile court to
measure up to-or even approach-the high hopes with which it was
initiated.' 6 Theoretically, juveniles received "benefits from the special
procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages
of denial of the substance of normal due process.- 17 However, the
11 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
12 S. Glueck & E. Glueck, supra note 10, at 257.
13 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23:

The rationale for this comprehensive array of jurisdictional pegs generally
emphasized the growth of social as opposed to legalistic justice and the new
efforts to bring the law out of isolation and into partnership with the ascending
social and behavioral sciences. It was strengthened by precepts of optimism and
paternalism. Children, assumed to be malleable, seem eminently salvageable; as
the rehabilitative theme crept into the criminal law, it naturally appeared most
applicable to children. Thus the juvenile court was to arrest the development of
full-fledged criminals by catching them early and uncovering and ameliorating
the causes of their disaffection .... The practicality of a stitch in time combined
with an idealistic faith in the social sciences and treatment to give them a zealous
desire to extend the juvenile court's helping hand as far as it could reach and a
somewhat uncritical conviction that whatever the court did, as long as it meant
well, was in the child's best interest.
A further rationale for the state's jurisdiction over noncriminal conduct has been
the idea that delinquency can or will be thereby prevented. A consultant to the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has argued
that:
This belief rests upon uncritical conceptions that there are substantive
behaviors, isometric in nature, which precede delinquency, much like prodromal
signs of the onset of disease....
Social science research and current theory in social psychology refute the idea
that there are fixed, inevitable sequences in delinquent or criminal careers. As
yet no behavior patterns or personality tendencies have been isolated and shown
to be the antecedents of delinquency, and it is unlikely that they will be.
Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 91, 93.
14 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26, 22 (1967). Much of the recent literature critical of
the juvenile court system is collected in this case. Id. at 18-30 nn.7-48.
15 Id. at 20 n.26, 22.
16 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

17 387 US. at 21.
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failure to observe the requirements of due process had resulted, all too
often, in depriving juveniles of their fundamental constitutional
rights.18

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended that noncriminal conduct be removed
from juvenile court jurisdiction.' 9 To those opposed to the relinquishment of jurisdiction, the Commission suggested that
we must bluntly ask what our present power achieves and must
acknowledge in answer that at the most we do not really know, and
in at least some cases we suspect it may do as much harm as good. 20
However, as the Commission realistically recognized, the necessity for
an undefined jurisdiction was and continues to be a real consideration. 21
The state must be able, in some authoritative way, to "protect them
from themselves and, often, from their environments. ' 22 The Supreme
Court, cognizant of the mounting criticism of the juvenile court system, began in the late 1960's to take a closer look at the constitutional
rights denied the juvenile under the doctrine of parens patriae.
In Kent v. United States,23 the Court held that a waiver order by
which jurisdiction over a serious offense committed by a juvenile was
transferred to an adult criminal court, when there had been no hearing, no effective assistance of counsel, nor statement of reasons, was
24
invalid as a denial of the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Kent was the first case to afford any due process guarantees to juveniles,
and set the tone for the Court's landmark decision in In re Gault.25

Gault revolutionized state juvenile court systems 26 by holding
that in proceedings where commitment to a state institution was
possible, the following due process guarantees were required: (1)
notice to parent and child adequate to afford reasonable opportunity
to prepare a defense, including a statement of the charge alleged with
particularity; (2) right to counsel, and if indigent, provision for the
appointment of counsel; (3) privilege against self-incrimination; and
18 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967). "Under our Constitution the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 28.
19 TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. It reached this position after concluding
that even the "most earnest efforts to narrow broad jurisdictional bases, in language
or practice, will not altogether remove the possibility of over extension." Id. See also
Bazelon, supra note 5, at 43.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 25.
22 Id.
23 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
24 Id. at 554, 562.
25 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26 Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and Mattiello
v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L Ray. 143, 143 (1969).
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(4) right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. 27 Gault
recognized the fact that unlimited judicial discretion, no matter how
benevolently implemented, was no substitute for procedural safe28
guards.
The Supreme Court further expanded due process guarantees
in juvenile proceedings in In re Winship,29 when the quantum of
proof for conviction for an alleged violation of criminal laws was raised
from a preponderance of the evidence to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt3o But the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania3' declined to extend
the due process right to a jury trial to delinquency proceedings, concluding that not all of the constitutional safeguards afforded adults in
criminal trials apply to juvenile proceedings.3 2 Despite the limitation
of McKeiver, the standard of fundamental fairness as developed by
Gault and Winship3a has resulted in both judicial and legislative reevaluation of broadly drawn juvenile statutes 34 which deprive juveniles
of procedural due process at the adjudicatory stage.
If the statute under which a juvenile is charged is so uncertain
and all-encompassing that the state need prove no specific crime or
course of harmful conduct, defense counsel has little idea of what
he must defend against, and thus minimal opportunity to be effective.-3
The continued application of these broadly drawn statutes renders
meaningless the rights accorded juveniles in Gault.8 6
Thus, the failure to provide for different classifications of juvenile
offenders based upon the nature of the acts committed has meant that
juveniles adjudicated delinquent on the basis of noncriminal behavior
are treated, in most jurisdictions, almost identically with juveniles
found to have broken criminal laws. 3 7 As one commentator has stated:
[T]hese children should not be taken from one bad situation and
put into another. They should not be taken from unfit homes and
committed to a state training school where murderers, rapists, etc.,
are their fellow students.3 8
387 U.S. at 31-57.
See id. at 18.
29 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
30 Id. at 368.
31 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
27

28

33

Id. at 545.
Id. at 543.

34

Note, supra note 3, at 569.

32

35 Comment, supra note 26, at 148 (footnote omitted).

Note, supra note 3, at 580.
See id. at 576-77.
s8 Comment, supra note 2, at 361.
Nevertheless, detaining noncriminal minors in the same facilities as criminal

36
37
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Two recent federal court decisions have considered the constitutionality of juvenile noncriminal conduct statutes whose terms were
typically vague and all-encompassing in their substantive definitions of
proscribed behavior. In Gesicki v. Oswald,3 9 a three-judge federal district court held that that part of New York's Wayward Minor Statute,
which granted adult criminal court jurisdiction over juveniles who were
"morally depraved" or "in danger of becoming morally depraved" 40
was void for vagueness.
Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Mailliard,41 another three-judge federal
district court declared that that part of a California juvenile statute
which granted juvenile court jurisdiction over children who were "in
danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life '42 was void
for vagueness.
In Gesicki, a girl of nineteen, whose father had died and whose
mother had been committed to a state mental hospital, 43 was expelled
from school for alleged "sexual promiscuity. ' 44 Shortly thereafter, the
state charged her with violation of the Wayward Minor Statute 45 for
children and often treating them similarly can have serious, results. The process
begun by labeling children delinquents and detaining them in juvenile halls has
been shown to affect their self-conceptions significantly enough to shape their
future behavior along more delinquent lines. In addition, the same logic which
prohibits the association of juvenile with adult criminals in jails-preventing
a "training ground" atmosphere for teaching illegal behavior-would appear to
cast doubt on the benefits of current methods of placing criminal and noncriminal
youths together.
Note, supra note 3, at 578 (footnotes omitted). Current New Jersey procedures permit the
institutional mingling of criminal youth, indeed, noncriminal youth over the age of
fifteen may be incarcerated with adults in such institutions as the Youth Reception and
Correctional Center, Yardville. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-146 (Supp. 1972), amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-146 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-147 (Supp. 1972), amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-147 (1964).
39 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
40 336 F. Supp. 371, 374.
41 Civil No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500
(U.S. Apr. 9, 1971) (No. 1565, 1970-71 Term; renumbered No. 70-120, 1971-72 Term).
Defendant Mailliard held the position of President of the Police Commission of the
City and County of San Francisco.
42 Id. slip opinion at 12.
43 Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
44 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5.
45 336 F. Supp. 365, 369 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). N.Y. CODE CruM. PRO. § 913-a (McKinney
1958) provides that
Any person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who either . . .
(5) is willfully disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of parent,
guardian or other custodian and is morally depraved or is in danger of becoming
morally depraved or (6) who without just cause and without the consent of
parents, guardians or other custodians, deserts his or her home or place of
abode, and is morally depraved or is in danger of becoming morally depraved ...
(7) . .. may be deemed a wayward minor.
336 F. Supp. 365, 368.
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alleged conduct that was morally depraved or was capable of leading
to moral depravity. 46 She was adjudicated a "wayward minor," put on
47
probation, and placed in a foster home.
Upon her mother's release from the state hospital, Esther Gesicki
sought to return home and, when her social worker refused to allow it,
she ran away. 48 Having violated probation,49 she was sent to Western
Reformatory in Albion, and was later transferred to Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility, both adult penal institutions. 50
Gesicki and two other girls who had been committed under the
same provisions of the Wayward Minor Statute sought relief in federal
court, 51 naming the State Commissioner of Correctional Services as
defendant. 52 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to enjoin further enforcement of the statute and to set aside their convictions, and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional 53 under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendmentm The district court
held that the imprecise language set forth in subsections (5) and (6)
of section 913-a raised "a substantial question as to whether that portion
of the statute is not unconstitutionally vague," 55 and a three-judge
district court was convened. 56 That court recognized that the case presented an
issue of fundamental importance concerning the power of a state
to enforce against juveniles a purportedly non-criminal statute
which permits commitment of defendants to adult criminal correctional programs and facilities, but is impermissibly vague if
judged by the standards applicable to penal laws. We hold that the
Section 913-a was permitted to expire by the legislature on August 31, 1971, but
persons found to have violated the statute prior to that date remained subject to its
provisions until the expiration of their terms in custody, parole or probation. 336 F.
Supp. 365, 366 n.2. See generally Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 32 Section 12 Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 579-95 (1972).
46 The state alleged that Miss Gesicki had had sexual relations with fourteen men.
336 F. Supp. 365, 369 n.4.
47 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5.
48 Id.
49 Brief for Plaintiff at 6, Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371.
50 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5.
51 See id. for histories of the other two girls.
52 336 F. Supp. 365, 365.
53 Id. at 366. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4) (1970) and 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
54 336 F. Supp. 365, 366. Plaintiffs sought to have the case determined a class action
and moved for an order convening a three-judge district court. Id. at 366-67.
55 336 F. Supp. 365, 371.
56 Id. (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970)).
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particular
provisions at issue, on their face, violate due process
57
of law.
The court concluded that the terms "morally depraved" and "in
danger of becoming morally depraved" were impermissibly vague in
their definition of criminal conduct. 5s
The court, however, believed it necessary to distinguish the Wayward Minor Statute from New York's general statutory scheme for
treating juvenile offenders. 59 While statutory jurisdiction over juvenile
offenders is contained in the Family Court Act (and while juvenile offenders may not be incarcerated in an adult prison pursuant to that act),
the Wayward Minor Statute was included in the Criminal Code, trials
were conducted in courts of general criminal jurisdiction, and incarceration was permitted in any adult correctional facility. 60

While the statute attacked in Gesicki could itself be a reason to
limit the holding, several aspects of the court's reasoning offer a broader
base from which to interpret the case. The court explicitly rejected the
traditional arguments that statutes dealing with juveniles are a legitimate
exercise of its power as parens patriae, and that the statute was nonpenal in nature since it failed to provide for criminal punishment. 61
Juveniles brought under the scope of the word "wayward" were deprived of the due process guarantee of fair notice of proscribed conduct
at the beginning of the procedure, and then faced an adjudication that
not only punished them like criminals, but confined them alongside
criminals in penal institutions. Under such a scheme, the parens patriae
rationale which relieves the need for full due process guarantees because
of the rehabilitory end, amounts to nothing more than adjudicating
juveniles as criminals without giving them those constitutional protections afforded adult criminals.
Specifically, there is no assurance that wayward minors will be
given special treatment substantially distinguishable from that
57 336 F. Supp. 371, 373.
58 Id. at 374.

59 Id. at 377 n.7. The court noted that its decision was not concerned with state
procedures which lead to special supervision of juveniles. The court limited its holding
to those procedures which led to the incarceration of juveniles with adult criminals.
Moreover, the court recognized
the justification and wisdom of identifying and affording bona fide treatment
to juveniles who exhibit behavioral deviations requiring treatment and intervention without which they might, in time, become adult criminals.
Id.
60 Compare N.Y. FAMILY Or. Acr §§ 731 et seq. (McKinney 1962) with N.Y. CODE
CIuM. PRo. § 913-a (McKinney 1958).
61 336 F. Supp. 371, 376-77.
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accorded to criminals and reasonably related to6the
condition upon
2
which the adjudicationof waywardness is based.
63
The court took judicial notice of the realities of institutional life.
In this regard, not only were adult institutions singled out for criticism,
but the court also noted that juvenile institutions were inadequate and
in need of attention. 64 In perhaps the strongest indictment of the
juvenile justice system appearing in a judicial opinion, the court quoted
the Director of the State's Division for Youth:

"With the exception of a relatively few youths, it would probably
be better for all concerned if young delinquents were not detected,
apprehended or institutionalized. Too many of them get worse in
65
our care."
The notion that there exists, for those held in involuntary noncriminal custody, a right to effective treatment to remedy the condition
which brought about their confinement, was first articulated slightly
over a decade ago. 66 It was argued that substantive due process requires
that the deprivation of liberty involved in a civil commitment be
justified by a provision for proper treatment.6 7 The right to treatment
initially achieved judicial recognition in cases involving persons acquitted of crime on the basis of mental defect or insanity who were then
involuntarily committed.6 8 In Wyatt v. Stickney,69 a federal district
court recently held that patients involuntarily committed through
civil proceedings to a state mental hospital were denied substantive
due process when they received inadequate treatment:
62 Id. at 379 (footnote omitted). Implicit in this statement is a recognition of the
"right to treatment" doctrine.
This concept is founded upon a recognition of the concurrency between the
state's exercise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the duties of social
responsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment must be the quid
pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriae controls. Whether
specifically recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly derived from the
constitutional requirements of due process, the right to treatment exists.
Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo.
L.J. 848, 870 (1969) (footnote omitted).
63 336 F. Supp. 371, 378.
64 Id. at 378 n.9. See authorities cited therein.
65 Id. at 378 (quoting from Samuels, When Children Collide with the Law, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1971, § 44 (Magazine), at 146).
66 See Birnbaum, The Right To Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). See also Cough,
The Beyond-Control Child And the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of
Paradox, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 182 (1971).
67

Id. at 503.

68 Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69 325 F. Supp. 781, enforced in 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For further
developments in this case see N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
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When patients are so committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental condition.... Adequate and
effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent
treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense." .. . The
purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment is treatment
and not mere custodial care or punishment. 70
The court rejected the contention that the failure to provide suitable
and adequate treatment could be justified by lack of operating funds
to provide for staff and facilities 71 when the immediate forfeiture of a
72
person's liberty was involved.
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and
then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process. 73
While the right to treatment has been recognized by statute in
nearly a dozen jurisdictions, 74 no court has specifically applied the
Wyatt substantive due process rationale to extend the constitutional
'right of treatment to include juveniles. 75 However, the doctrine has
had recent application in a variety of state jurisdictions involving
commitments from juvenile courts, often without specific mention. 76
In Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services,7 7 a New
York federal district court held that the treatment received by a nondelinquent fourteen-year-old in custody as a "person in need of supervision" violated the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
78
unusual punishment.
The Gesicki court recognized that a central infirmity of noncriminal conduct statutes is that there is no actual reference to conduct,
but only to a condition or status of being.79 The court held that the
70

325 F. Supp. at 784 (citations omitted).

71 Id.
72 Id.

at 785.

73 Id.

74 Note, An Important Step Towards Recognition of the Constitutional Right to
Treatment, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 340, 344 (1971).
75 Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAM. LQ. 279, 296 (1972).
76 See, e.g., In re Arnold, 12 Md. App. 384, 396, 278 A.2d 658, 664 (1971); In re Hamill,
10 Md. App. 586, 591-93, 271 A.2d 762, 765-66 (1970); In re I, 64 Misc. 2d 878, 879, 316
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (Fam. Ct. 1970); In re Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482, 486-87 (N.D. 1966).
77 322 F. Supp. 473 (1970), modified, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
78 322 F. Supp. at 482-83.
79 336 F. Supp. 371, 376.
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Wayward Minor Statute acted impermissibly to punish a status," °
permitting the "unconstitutional punishment of a minor's condition,
rather than of any specific actions, as did the statute penalizing narcotics addiction condemned in Robinson v. California.. ... ,
In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that a California statute
which made the "status" of narcotics addiction a criminal offense and
which provided for imprisonment was violative of constitutional safeguards.8 2 The Court concluded that the statute inflicted a cruel and
3
unusual punishment in violation of the fourteenth amendment,
and stated that "[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
84
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
The Gesicki court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that any
punishment for the condition of being a "morally depraved" minor is
cruel and unusual.8 5 The court rejected the state's assertion that wayward minors were treated on the basis of their individual needs and
not punished 6 because the statute failed to require any specific course
of treatment.8 7 Thus, the court recognized that the status situation
inherent in the proscription of noncriminal conduct requires provision
for the effective treatment of that condition in order to constitutionally
justify the juvenile's loss of liberty.
Gesicki can be interpreted as a strong statement for greater procedural safeguards for juveniles. If punishment rather than treatment
results, then juveniles should at least be made aware of specifically
defined acts that constitute wrongful conduct. In conclusion, the court
held that the Wayward Minor Statute was the substantial equivalent of
a criminal provision, and that it failed to define the proscribed conduct
which could bring a juvenile within its jurisdiction."8 This being so, the
statute was violative of due process since it failed to comport with the
standard of fundamental fairness applicable to all juvenile proceed9
ings.8
The Supreme Court, in May, 1972, affirmed without opinion the
80 Id.

at 373.

81 Id. at 376 (footnote omitted).
82
83
84
85

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
Id. at 667.
Id.
336 F. Supp. 371, 376.

86 Id.

Id. at 379.
88 Id.
89 ld. See 403 U.S. at 543: "[T]he applicable due process standard in juvenile proceeding . . . is fundamental fairness."
87
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district court's decision. 90 For the first time the void for vagueness
doctrine was successfully employed in striking down as unconstitutional
a broad jurisdictional statute concerned with noncriminal juvenile
conduct.
Recently, in Gonzalez v. Mailliard,91 a California juvenile statute
which extended juvenile court jurisdiction to juveniles who exhibit
certain types of noncriminal behavior was attacked in federal court.
Section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code permitted any person
under the age of twenty-one to be adjudged a ward of the juvenile
court "who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd or immoral life."' 92 As in New York, earlier challenges of the
statute's language in state courts as unconstitutionally vague and indefinite were unsuccessful.
Gonzalez was a member of the "24th Street Gang," a group of
youths who were arrested by two police officers dispatched to investigate
a report that an individual had been robbed by gang members.9 3 The
victim named the gang and three individual members as her attackers.
The police took ten members of the gang into custody on the grounds
that they were in "danger of leading a lewd or dangerous life," in
94
violation of section 601, the state's noncriminal delinquency statute.
All ten were then arrested on charges of suspicion of robbery and for
criminal violations of the juvenile delinquency statute, section 602.
Later, all charges against them were dropped and they were released
95
from custody.
A class action was brought seeking a declaratory judgment that
the vagueness of section 60 l's words "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life," rendered the statute unconstitutional.
90 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
91 No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W.
Apr. 9, 1971) (No. 1565, 1970-71 Term; renumbered No. 70-120, 1971-72 Term).

3500 (U.S.

92 CAL. W.LF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966):

Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitually refuses
to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian,
custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the control of such person, or
any person who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of any law
of this state, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
A 1971 amendment lowered the jurisdictional age from twenty-one to eighteen. CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1971).
93 No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), slip opinion at 2.

94 Id. slip opinion at 2.
95 Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'N$ CODE § 601 (West

1966).
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They sought a permanent injunction against arrests under the statute,
and an order expunging their records for noncriminal conduct arrests
under section 601.96 A three-judge district court found the challenged
clause of section 601 unconstitutional and granted all the relief
sought. 97 Taking notice of the many recent federal court decisions
holding adult vagrancy statutes unconstitutionally vague, 95 the court
rejected the state's attempt to distinguish these cases by affixing a civil
label to the delinquency statute.99
Like the Gesicki court, the Gonzalez court looked to the nature
and consequences of juvenile incarceration. The court recognized that
"[t]he more extensive the deprivation, the greater the due process requirement for certainty of statutory language."' 10 0 In Gesicki, the court
distinguished juvenile proceedings under the aegis of the family court
from the Wayward Minor Statute (which was within the jurisdiction of
the criminal court) 101 and took exception to the practice of incarcerating juveniles in adult institutions without specific provision for treatment and rehabilitation. 02 In contrast, the California statute established a juvenile court proceeding and additional provisions provided
for commitment in one of two juvenile homes or camps under county
control. 10 3 Indeed, a minor adjudged a ward of the court for noncriminal behavior under section 601 could not be committed to the separately operated state juvenile facilities under California Youth Authority control; a juvenile can be committed to the latter only when
the commission of a crime can be proved under section 602.104
Nevertheless, the court concluded that, despite the fact that
"[j]uvenile homes or camps are admittedly 'low-security' institutions
that attempt to maintain a rehabilitative, home-like atmosphere," their
rehabilitative ideal failed to distinguish them "from the Youth Authority institutions, nor indeed from modem adult penal institutions."1 05
Having equated the seriousness of the deprivation of freedom in
juvenile facilities with that of adult prisons, the court concluded that
the statute's "immoral" clause was too vague to serve as a constitu96 No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), slip opinion at 2.
97 Id. slip opinion at 12.
98 Id. slip opinion at 7. See notes 126 and 130 infra.
99 Id. slip opinion at 8.
100 Id. See notes 113 and 114 infra.
101 336 F. Supp. 371, 377 and 377 n.7.
102 Id. at 377-78.
103 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS COnE § 730 (west 1972).
104 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 731 (west 1972).
105 Civil No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), slip opinion at 9.
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tionally permissible standard-and that it was therefore violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 06
The court recognized that a "central infirmity of a vague statute
10 7
is that its vagueness makes other due process guarantees meaningless.'
It then analyzed the failure of procedural due process guarantees that
had been applied to juvenile proceedings in Gault that had resulted
from the lack of substantive definition in the statute.
Of what possible utility is notice of charges when the charge is
merely that one is "dissolute"? What use is counsel when it is impossible to know what type of evidence is relevant to rebuttal of
the prosecution case?
...Standards of proof depend on standards of relevance and
probativeness, and these are precluded when the substantive offense
covers the entire moral dimension of one's life. 108
A majority of American jurisdictions have broadly drawn juvenile
statutes proscribing a wide range of noncriminal conduct and providing
for incarceration in a variety of institutions under the guise of rehabilitation and reformation. As Gesicki and Gonzalez have observed, these
vaguely drawn, all-encompassing provisions are based on subjective and
arbitrary determinations of conduct made without reasonable standards
of specificity. Their continued application results in a denial of constitutional rights and exposes noncriminal juveniles to criminal influences during commitment. Before surveying how state courts have
adjudged attacks for vagueness on their juvenile statutes, the applicable standards for an attack on a vague statute should be explored.
The successful application of the void for vagueness doctrine as a
mode of constitutional challenge of the statutes in Gesicki and Gonzalez
would appear to cast doubt on, the constitutional validity of most of
this nation's juvenile statutes which proscribe noncriminal conduct. It
is a basic principle of constitutional law that a statute which lacks specificity and certainty is void under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 9 The direct application of the doctrine to juvenile
proceedings has been impeded by arguments that the juvenile system
106 Id. slip opinion at 12.
Id. slip opinion at 10.

107

108 Id. slip opinion at 11-12.
109 See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. Rav. 67 (1960). See also Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MIcH. L.
Rav. 831 (1923); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CoNa.EL L.Q.
195 (1955); Freund, Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921); Note,
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HIAv. L. REV. 77 (1948);. Note,
Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:184

is protective rather than penal 11 0 and civil rather than criminal."" The
Supreme Court has, however, explicitly refused to limit the application
of the void for vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes. The Court held
constitutional standards of specificity applicable in a civil contract dispute in A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. 112
In the interpretation of nonpenal statutes, the Court has looked to
the severity of the penalty imposed by the statute in reaching a determination of whether a statute will survive an attack on vagueness
grounds."13 In Jordanv. De George,1 4 the Court stated:
Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall
nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine
to this case. We do this in view of the grave nature of deportation.
The Court has stated that "deportation is a drastic measure . ... "
We shall, therefore, test this statute under the established criteria
of the "void for vagueness" doctrine. 115
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,"" the Court struck down a statute
which permitted the jury to assess prosecution costs against a defendant
acquitted of criminal charges if it found him guilty of "some misconduct." 1 7 The Court dismissed the state's assertion that the statute,

which was guided by no standards whatever, was merely a civil sanction
and hence not subject to the vagueness test," 8 and reasoned that the
due process protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment "is not to
be avoided by the simple label a state chooses to fasten upon its conduct or its statute." 119 The Supreme Court, moreover, has raised grave
doubts that a decision in a juvenile court case can be defended by a
simple pronouncement that the proceedings are civil in nature. 20
The seminal case prescribing the test for determining whether a
statute contains sufficient specificity to pass constitutional muster is
Connally v. General Construction Co.,121 where the Court stated that
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
110 See, e.g Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 50, 62 A. 198, 199 (1905).

III

C. VEDDER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER 235 (1954).
112 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
11 Note (U. PA. L. REV.), supra note 109, at 69-70 n.16.
114 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
115 Id. at 231. The test was applied in upholding a statute permitting deportation
upon conviction of a "crime involving moral turpitude."
116 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
117.
118

Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 402.

119 Id.
120
121

387 US. at 49-50.
269 US. 385 (1926).
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guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
22
first essential of due process of law.'
Applying the Connally test, the Court in Musser v. Utahx23 vacated

petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals. 124 The statute was defectively imprecise since it failed
to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding,
to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they
are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are accused. 2 5
The judge and jury were thus allowed an inordinate amount of discretion in determining the criminality of the condemned conduct.
The same vague and subjective standards for determining civil or
quasi-criminal conduct has been incorporated into the broadly drawn
and severely criticized adult vagrancy statutes. 2 6 In Goldman v.
Knecht,12 a three-judge federal court struck down a Colorado statute
defining a vagrant as a person "leading an idle, immoral, or profligate
course of life" as unconstitutionally vague. 28 Goldman was soon followed by the Supreme Court decision of Coates v. Cincinnati 29 where
a vagrancy ordinance prohibiting an assembly of three or more people
on a public sidewalk conducting themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by was held unconstitutional:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others.
Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a
122 id. at 391. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29,
32-33 (1963), which stated:
Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not
attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated
conduct is proscribed.
See also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process
clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not
serve to validate it. . . . It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that
prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.
Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
123 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
124 Id. at 96.
125 Id. at 97.
126 Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 904 n.21 (D. Colo. 1969). Broad vagrancy
statutes, like broad delinquency statutes, are defended on the ground that since vagrancy
is a preliminary stage of serious criminality, early intervention is vital to community
interests. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972). However
there is no statistical correlation between vagrancy and criminality to warrant such
intervention. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 627 (1956).
127 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969).
128 Id. at 905.
129 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
30
conduct is specified at all.
The language proscribing noncriminal conduct in juvenile statutes
is similar in breadth to the adult vagrancy statutes. Language regulating
conduct and behavior rather than criminal acts is by its very nature and
necessity broadly drawn. When the vagueness standard is applied to juvenilestatutes, whether labeled as civil or criminal, a serious doubt may
be raised concerning their compliance with due process requirements.
The void for vagueness doctrine gives vitality to all the other due
process guarantees. The right to counsel, the right to fair notice, the
right to confrontation of witnesses are all vacuous without precise statutory construction. As the failure of the rehabilitative aspect of juvenile
incarceration continues to be attacked and its penal nature becomes
more obvious, the Gault procedural due process guarantees are frustrated by vague statutes which are incapable of definition. While the
Gault Court did not rely on differences in nomenclature and the civilcriminal dichotomy, it attached greater significance to the consequences
of juvenile statutes with their provisions for commitment and deprivation of liberty.13 '
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called
an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for
juveniles is an institution of confinement .... His world becomes
"a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours ....
" [P]eopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from
32
waywardness to rape and homicide.
130 Id. at 614. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544 (1971) ("suspicious
person"); Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("leading
an immoral and profligate life'); Original Fayette County Civic & Welf. League v.
Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 89, 92 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) ("the use of rude, boisterous, offensive,
obscene or blasphemous language . . . or to conduct oneself in a disorderly manner").
See generally Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203 (1953); Watts,
Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349 (1967).
131 387 U.S. at 50.
132 Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted). The same point has been made by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing"
criminal Justice, 1958 Soc. SaRv. REv. 107, 116; Lerman, Beyond Gault: Injustice
and the Child, in DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL POLICY 236, 241 (P. Lerman ed. 1970); Malmquist, Dilemmas of the Juvenile Court, 6 J. AM. AcAD. CHILD. PsYCH. 723, 735-36 (1967);
Paulsen, supra note 1, at 48. For an account of the harm inflicted on juveniles committed
to correctional institutions, see Sheridan, Delinquents Without Crime, in DELINQUENCY
AND SOCIAL POLICY 69, 69-72 (P. Lerman ed. 1970).
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It would appear reasonable to conclude that Gault requires the application of a stringent standard of substantive, as well as procedural
due process to vaguely drawn noncriminal conduct clauses since in
practice, juveniles, like adults, are faced with the possibility of incarceration and loss of liberty.
Under the broad umbrella of authority furnished by Gault, an attack was mounted in the late 1960's on broadly drawn juvenile statutes
using the vagueness doctrine as a basis. Initial attempts through the
state courts were not successful.
In E.S.G. v. State,1" a Texas civil court of appeals upheld language
in an omnibus clause which defined a delinquent child as one "who
habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or
health of himself or others .... -134The statute had been challenged as
unconstitutionally vague. 135 While the court conceded that the clause in
question defined the conduct of a delinquent child in general terms, it
held that the rights of the child were protected insofar as the statute required that prohibited acts or conduct be specifically alleged. 13 Additionally the court stated that, while the word "morals" conveys precise
impressions to an adult, 137 it would be an impossible task to define with
specificity all types of conduct which could conceivably impair a child's
morals. 13 8 A strongly worded dissent emphasized the lack of notice of
proscribed conduct:
Here, a directive addressed to children is couched in terms which
have been the source of controversy among theologians, philosophers and judges for centuries ....
It is another thing to expect
a child of ten or, as in this case, of fourteen, to understand the
meaning of words which judges are unable to define while assuring
us that the language is "perfectly clear." 1 9
The majority emphasized traditional juvenile court philosophy, noting
that the statute was protective and rehabilitative in nature and sought
133

447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).

134 TEx. REv. CAV.STAT. ANN.

art. 2338-1,

§ 3(f) (1971).

447 S.W.2d at 227. See Note, An Aspect of the Texas Juvenile Delinquency Law"Morals," 24 Sw. L.J. 698 (1970); Note, [Texas Statute] Defining Delinquent Child as One
Who "Habitually So Deports Himself As To Injure or Endanger the Morals or Health of
Himself or Others," Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 126 (1970).
136 447 S.W.2d at 227. But see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939): "It is
the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and
warns against transgression."
137 447 S.W.2d at 226.
138 Note (Sw. L.J.), supra note 135, at 702-03.
135

1"9 447 S.W.2d at 231 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
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"to correct habits and patterns of behavior which are injurious to the
health or morals of the child .... ",140
In State v. Mattiello,141 a seventeen-year-old girl was convicted
under a Connecticut statute granting circuit court jurisdiction over
one "in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice, or who is leading
a vicious life."' 142 A demurrer was filed to the charge, alleging the terms
"habits of vice" and "vicious life" violated the due process clause since
they purported to define a crime in language too vague and uncertain in
its meaning to give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed or to
guide the courts in its fair administration. 143 The court overruled the
demurrer and on appeal the conviction was affirmed.' 44 The appellate
division held that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's power as
parens patriae,that the proceeding was civil rather than criminal in nature, and that its end was not to punish, but rather to rehabilitate the
145
child through guardianship and protection.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Commonwealth v. Brasher,146 upheld the constitutionality of that state's 325year-old "stubborn child" law which was attacked as being so vague and
indefinite as to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 47 Specifically the defendant argued that the statute left judges
Id. at 226.
4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d
201 (1966), prob. juris. noted, 391 U.S. 963 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of a properly
presented federal question, 395 U.S. 209 (1969). See Comment, supra note 26, at 145.
142 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-379 (1960). The full text reads:
Any unmarried female between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one years
who is in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice, or who is leading a vicious
life, or who has committed any crime, may, upon the complaint of the prosecuting attorney of the circuit court, be brought before said court for the circuit
within whose jurisdiction she resides or is found, and, upon conviction thereof,
may be committed, until she has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, to the
custody of any institution, except Long Lane School, chartered by the general
assembly or incorporated under the general laws for the purpose of receiving
and caring for females who have fallen into or are in danger of falling into
vicious habits.
143 4 Conn. Cir. at 57, 225 A.2d at 509.
144 Id. at 62, 225 A.2d at 511. Miss Mattiello was also charged with violations of
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-219 (1960) (forbidding walking with a lascivious carriage) and
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-175 (1960) (disorderly conduct). She was acquitted of the
disorderly conduct charge but found guilty of lascivious carriage. Her appeal, however,
was based solely on the conviction under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-379 (1960).
145 4 Conn. Cir. at 61-62, 225 A.2d at 511.
Mass. -, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971).
146 147 Id. at -, 270 N.E.2d at 392. The statute attacked was MAss. G.N. LAws ANN. ch.
272, § 53 (1968). The full text reads:
Stubborn children, runaways, common night walkers, both male and female,
common railers and brawlers, persons who with offensive and disorderly act or
language accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and lascivious
140
141
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and jurors free to determine on a case-by-case basis what is permissible
148
juvenile conduct without any legally-fixed standards.
The court reasoned that the statute proscribed conduct that had
long been recognized by the state as amounting to criminal behavior:
The fact that a child is under a moral obligation to obey his parents
does not preclude the Legislature, in the exercise of its police power,
from making that same obligation a legal one, with criminal pen149
alties for its breach.
The court determined that the elements of the crime identified by the
use of the words "stubborn children" were the refusal of a child in a
willful, obstinate, and persistent way to obey the lawful and reasonable
commands of a person in authority.150 The court concluded that there
was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to indicate defendant was a
stubborn child. 151
A California court of appeals, in In re Daniel R., 1 52 held that the
statute's "words 'dissolute and immoral' met constitutional standards of
certainty and definiteness" on the authority of earlier decisions construing those terms in the context of adult crimes. 155 The court believed it
persons in speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons, prostitutes, disturbers
of the peace, keepers of noisy and disorderly houses and persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction
for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
See Katz & Schroeder, Disobeying a Father's Voice: A Comment on Commonwealth v.
Brasher, 57 MAss. L.Q. 43 (1972); Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law: Law
and Order in the Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33 (1972).
148 - Mass. at -, 270 N.E.2d at 392.
149 Id. at -,
270 N.E.2d at 393.
150 Id. at -, 270 N.E.2d at 393.
151 Id. at -, 270 N.E.2d at 395. The court rejected as irrelevant to the issues
[a] substantial portion of the defendant's brief [which] is devoted to the statement of facts and arguments of a sociological nature . . . criticizing the physical
facilities available for the detention of such offenders ....
Id. at -, 270 N.E.2d at 394.
152 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
153 Id. at 752-53, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
In attempting to define the language in juvenile noncriminal statutes, courts faced
with the paucity of juvenile case law have looked to adult criminal statutes employing
similar language for guidance. See, e.g., E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969). Most states have statutes making it a criminal act to contribute to the delinquency of a minor. Delinquency is usually defined as any act which tends to injure
the morals, health or welfare of the child. Typically, crimes against juveniles are in the
area of sexual abuses or the serving of alcoholic beverages. These statutes, until recently,
had been almost universally held constitutional as against attack for vagueness. See, e.g.,
Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959); People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d
410, 256 P.2d 355 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). The analogy may be questioned since the meaning
of such terms as "morals" in these instances was derived from statutory language directed
at adults. Where similar language is directed towards children, it would appear unreason-
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reasonable that there should be some method by which a juvenile could
be made a ward of the court other than in a dependency situation or
when the commission of a crime was involved. 154 The standard applied
in construing the statute was to be " '[r]easonable certainty, in view of
the conditions,' " and that " 'liberal effect.., be given to the legislative
intent when possible.' '155
New York's Wayward Minor Statute, declared unconstitutional in
Gesicki, followed a similar judicial history as that demonstrated by
the preceding cases. The state's highest court, just prior to Gault, sustained without analysis the constitutionality of the statute against
the proposition that it was unconstitutionally vague in People v. Salis156
bury.
In People v. Allen,'157 the court of appeals reversed the convictions
of three juveniles who had been individually adjudicated wayward
minors on the allegation that they were "morally depraved or in danger
of becoming so." 15 Faced by a definition of conduct that was so
broadly drawn as to render precise analysis impossible, the court of
appeals lamented:
It is not easy to define this for all kinds of situations and, of
course, the draftsmen of the statute in 1923 .. . had difficulties in-

trinsic to the objective sought. Part of the trouble in the resolution
of the draft is "morally depraved", a term which probably changes
in meaning for each generation. The term is one not readily visualized. Even less easily palpable is "danger of becoming" morally depraved. 159
The Allen court read Gault as imposing on juvenile courts all the
able to expect them to understand the meaning of words which the courts themselves are
unable to define with any specificity. See Judge Cadena's dissent in E.S.G. v. State, 447
S.W.2d at 230-31, for a well-reasoned attack on this practice.
Recent decisions have questioned the measure of due process afforded adults charged
with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 457
P.2d 491 (1969), an Oregon statute was held to be unconstitutional under the void for
vagueness test. Following this decision the Oregon Supreme Court set aside the adjudication of delinquency of a sixteen-year-old boy who had been charged with contributing
to the delinquency of a fourteen-year-old girl. The court reasoned that the juvenile had
the same right as an adult defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the statute
for vagueness. State v. Oman, 254 Ore. 59, 457 P.2d 496 (1969).
154 274 Cal. App. 2d at 753, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
155 Id. (quoting from People v. Kennedy, 21 Cal. App. 2d 185, 193, 69 P.2d 224, 229
(Dist. Ct. App. 1937)).
156 18 N.Y.2d 899, 900, 223 N.E.2d 43, 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (1966), remittitur
granted, 19 N.Y.2d 703, 225 N.E.2d 576, 577, 278 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (1967).
157 22 N.Y.2d 465, 239 N.E.2d 879, 293 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1968).
158 Id. at 473, 239 N.E.2d at 882-83, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 284. The statute alleged to be
violated was N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 913-a(5) and (6) (McKinney 1958).
159 22 N.Y.2d at 471, 239 N.E.2d at 881, 293 N.Y.S2d at 283 (citation omitted).
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constitutional restraints applicable to adversary criminal trials, just
as Justice Stewart had feared in his Gault dissent. 160 To be in accord
with Gault, the Allen court reasoned that the substantive definition
of conduct which subjects the juvenile to penal or corrective discipline
should be a procedural requirement. 6 1 The court, however, was able
to avoid overruling Salisbury on the constitutional issue of vagueness
by simply holding that the adjudications of waywardness were not sustained by the record. 16 2 The court followed the same tact in refusing
to reconsider Salisbury in People v. Duke' 63 and People v. Gregory
E.164

New Jersey's Juvenile Delinquency Statute 165 perhaps is the least
helpful of all definitions, tautologically defining delinquency as "incorrigibility," "immorality" or "growing up in idleness or delinquency." 16
Other noncriminal acts which will support an adjudication of delinquency in New Jersey include "habitual vagrancy," "knowingly associating with thieves or vicious or immoral persons," and "idly roaming
the streets at night.' 167 The statute's omnibus clause defines delinquency
as "deportment endangering the morals, health or general welfare of
168
said child.'
160 Id. at 469, 239 N.E.2d at 880, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
161 Id. at 469-70, 239 N.E.2d at 880, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
162 Id. at 471-73, 239 N.E.2d at 881-82, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 283-84.
163 23 N.Y.2d 780, 244 N.E.2d 711, 297 N.YS.2d 144 (1968).
164 26 N.Y.2d 622, 255 N.E.2d 721, 307 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1970).
165 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (1952). That portion of the statute extending the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over noncriminal conduct reads as follows:
Juvenile delinquency is hereby defined as the commission by a child under
18 years of age ... [of any]

(2) of the following acts:
e. Habitual vagrancy, or
f. Incorrigibility, or
g. Immorality, or
h. Knowingly associating with thieves or vicious or immoral persons, or
i. Growing up in idleness or delinquency, or
j. Knowingly visiting gambling places, or patronizing other places or establishments, his admission to which constitutes a violation of law, or
k. Idly roaming the streets at night, or
I. Habitual truancy from school, or
m. Deportment endangering the morals, health or general welfare of said
child.
166 Comment, supra note 26, at 152. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(f), (g), and (i) (1952).
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(e), (h), (k) (1952).
168 N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:4-14(m) (1952). See generally Note, Problems Arising Under
the New Jersey Juvenile Court Law, 11 RuTGERs L. Rlv. 641 (1957) which states:
Provision m . . .seems to be so vague that it could encompass almost any act
and makes definition almost impossible.
Id. at 645 (footnote omitted). The author, however, found justification for the statute in the
benefits to be derived from this flexible approach to juvenile offenders given to
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Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed without opinion
the appellate division's decision in State v. L.N., 169 which upheld the
constitutionality of subsections (i) and (in) against an attack for vagueness. These subsections provide for an adjudication of delinquency for
"growing up in idleness or delinquency" and "deportment endangering the morals, health or general welfare of said child."' 170 The court
found no merit in the defendant's contention that the failure to give
him adequate notice of the charge amounted to a denial of due process.
Rather, the court held that for a juvenile, the specificity of a criminal
complaint was not necessary. 171 The court could find no authority for
the proposition that juvenile statutes proscribing noncriminal conduct
had been held unconstitutionally violative of due process because of
vagueness. 172 The court rejected defendant's contention that Gault had
exposed broadly drawn juvenile statutes to constitutional scrutiny. The
court, unlike the Allen court, did not feel constrained to afford juveniles broader due process rights than those enunciated in Gault.173
The L.N. court continued with a description of the state's philosophy of the juvenile court system:
The juvenile court proceeding is not the trial of a child charged
with a crime but is mercifully designed to save him from such an
ordeal in the future .... It has been said to be designed to make
men out of errant boys ....The State as parens patriae has a duty
to see to it that a minor does not live a life of delinquency....

The philosophy of our juvenile court system is aimed at rehabilitaa detion through reformation and education in order to 7restore
4
linquent youth to a position of responsible citizenship.
The court found nothing in Gault which denied the state the authority to discipline noncriminal conduct which threatened either the
child's or society's welfare. 175 The court read Gault to require the procedural due process safeguards in juvenile proceedings, 176 and concluded
that the defendant was fully aware of the specific nature of his actions
the courts so as to accomplish their desired end of individual care and rehabilitation.
Id. at 646.
169 109 N.J. Super. 278, 286-87, 263 A.2d 150, 155 (App. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 57 N.J.
165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971).
170 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(i) and (m) (1952).
171 109 N.J. Super. at 284, 263 A.2d at 153.
172 Id. L.N. was decided in 1970 before Gesicki and Gonzalez.
173 Id. at 286, 263 A.2d at 154.
174 Id. at 285-86, 263 A.2d at 154-55 (citations omitted).
175 Id. at 286, 263 A.2d at 154.
176

Id.
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that constituted the basis for the alleged violation.177 Notwithstanding
the L.N. court's opinion, a juvenile is entitled to prior notice of what
act or omission constituted unacceptable behavior under the statute. 178
As a result of the criticism and the failure of the present juvenile
correction system, new legislation has been enacted to ameliorate some
of the present defects.
As a possible alternative, the President's Commission has proposed
non-coercive community aid facilities for noncriminal juveniles. Based
on this proposal, Youth Service Bureaus have been instituted in several
states to provide individual and family counseling to troubled youngsters and their families. 179
The more probable alternative, since the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over the conduct in question, provides for different classifications of juvenile offenders based upon the nature of the acts committed and permits the treatment of these classes in different ways.' 80
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1966 created the category of "minor
otherwise in need of supervision" for a juvenile charged with violations
of noncriminal conduct.' 8' New York's Family Court Act of 1963 has
labeled a juvenile involved in noncriminal conduct as a "person in need
of supervision," commonly referred to as a "PINS."'18 2 The statute, however, has defined a PINS in traditionally broad language, including
such categories as "incorrigible," "ungovernable," and "beyond lawful
18 3
control."
177 Id. at 287, 263 A.2d at 155.
178 Comment, supra note 26, at 152. Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 365, 369.
,179 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-21. Note, supra note 3, at 578. See
generally Note, A Proposal for the More Effective Treatment of the "Unruly" Child in
Ohio: The Youth Services Bureau, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 275 (1970). Similar programs are
also under consideration in Great Britain. See Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Great
Britain Home Office, the Child, the Family, and the Young Offender, in JUVENILE COURIS
440, 440-42 (0. Ketcham & M. Paulsen eds. 1967).
180 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. Comment, supra note 2, at 363.
181 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2 to 702-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
182 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
However, the failure or inability of New York's legislature to sufficiently fund adequate alternative treatment programs for its PINS has, it is argued, reduced the statutory
differentiation between delinquents and noncriminal youth to a "legal distinction without
a social difference." Comment, Nondelinquent Children in New York: The Need for
Alternatives to Institutional Treatment, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 251, 284 (1972).
183 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
The statute has recently been attacked on the grounds that it is violative of due
process by reason of vagueness, and also that it offended the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment on the grounds that it discriminated against sixteen and seventeen-year-old girls. The court of appeals rejected the first claim, distinguishing the Wayward Minor Statute in the Gesicki case, from the PINS statute. (See note 59 supra for
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Legislation recently proposed by the New Jersey State Bar Association's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency would bring much needed
revision to this state's juvenile court system. Draft legislation would
establish dual categories for conduct labeled either "delinquency" or
"person in need of supervision." The text of the proposals read in part
as follows:
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-44 DEFINITION OF "DELINQUENCY"
(a) As used in this Article, "delinquency" means the commission
of an act by a juvenile which if committed by an adult would constitute:
1. A high misdemeanor or misdemeanor,
2. A disorderly persons offense, or
3. A violation of municipal penal ordinance.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4:45 DEFINITION OF "PERSON IN
NEED OF SUPERVISION"
(a) As used in this Article, "person in need of supervision" means:
1. A juvenile who is habitually disobedient to the lawful commands of his parent or guardian when such disobedience
makes him ungovernable or incorrigible.
2. A juvenile who is habitually and voluntarily truant, or
3. A juvenile who has committed an offense applicable only
to juveniles.
(b) No juvenile shall be adjudged to be a person in need
of super184
vision unless he is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.

These proposals are an improvement over the current statutory scheme
in that the distinction is clearly drawn between what is labeled criminal
and what is labeled noncriminal behavior. At present both types of becourt's reasoning.). The court held there was no justification for the age-sex distinction in
section 712(b), and so struck down that portion of the statute as violative of the equal
protection clause. In re Patricia A., No. - (N.Y. Ct. App. July 7, 1972). See, e.g., Comment,
Juvenile Delinquency Laws: Juvenile Women And The Double Standard of Morality, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 313 (1971).
The equal protection argument may figure prominently in future challenges of
juvenile statutes. See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972), in which an
Oklahoma statute permitting females under the age of eighteen benefits of a juvenile
court proceeding, while limiting the same benefits to males under the age of sixteen, was
held to be violative of the equal protection clause.
184 Legislation proposed by the N.J. Bar Ass'n, Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.
The proposed section 2A:4-45(a)(3) does not attempt to expand the court's jurisdiction over PINS.
[I]t was the clear agreement of all members of the committee involved in drafting
the proposal that 2A:4-45(a)3 . . . includes only those juveniles who have committed some specific statutory offense, which by its terms applies only to juveniles.
Examples of this sort of offense are curfew violations and certain alcoholicbeverage infractions. It was certainly not the intent to create a whole expanded
common law of judge-created offenses applicable only to juveniles.
Letter from John M. Cannel, Reporter, New Jersey Bar Association, Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency, to author, October 20, 1972, on file in the Seton Hall Law Review.
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havior are considered delinquency under section 2A:4-14. Moreover,
under the proposed sections 2A:4-61 and 62, a child labeled a PINS will
no longer suffer under the delinquent label; the child will be given the
type of treatment and supervision required for rehabilitation while he
is separated from serious offenders. Section 2A:4-62(b) specifically provides for the penal preclusion of PINS:
No juvenile shall be committed to or placed in any institution
or facility established for the care of deliquent children nor in any
facility other than a mental hospital which physically restricts
children committed to or placed in it as part of a disposition under
this section.1 85
Revision of the state's juvenile statutes in this manner would accord
with such model laws as the Uniform Juvenile Court Act and that proposed by the Legislative Guide, as well as legislation already enacted
by such jurisdictions as New York, California, and Illinois. 186
The successful application of the void for vagueness doctrine to
noncriminal conduct statutes is a further affirmation by the federal
courts that the constitutional domestication of the juvenile court system
is still in progress. The Gesicki and Gonzalez opinions throw considerable doubt on the constitutional validity of most of this nation's juvenile court statutes. Due process, as formulated in these cases, requires
a substantive definition of the conduct sought to be proscribed, in order
that fair notice be given to the potential juvenile offender. This definition should be based on objective, ascertainable standards of application
to preclude arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Upon commitment, the noncriminal juvenile should be afforded the right to treatment which has a rational relationship to the nature of his condition.
Juvenile legislation should be brought into harmony with these constitutional requirements.
The Supreme Court set in motion a revolution throughout the
juvenile justice system as a result of its decision in Gault. Dean Paulsen
wrote in 1967 that the language of Gault "reads like a warning shot,
1 87 It
fired to gain the attention of state court judges and lawmakers."'
is time that New Jersey heed that admonition.
Robert G. Rose
185
186

Legislation proposed by the N.J. Bar Ass'n, Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.
See UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT §§ 2(2) and (3) (1969); UNITED STATES DEPART-

MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICE, LEGISLA-

AmTS (Children's Bureau Pub. No.
472, 1969). See, e.g., Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a
CorrectionalSystem?, 31 FED. PROB. 26 (1967).
187 Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 SuP. Cr.
REV. 233, 237.
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